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From the point of view of a profit-maximizing firm, the optimal number of working hours 
depends not only on the marginal productivity of hours but also on the marginal labour cost.  
This paper develops and assesses empirically a simple model of firms' decision making where 
productivity varies with hours and where the firm faces labour costs per worker that are 
invariant to the number of hours worked: i.e. quasi-fixed labour costs. Using Belgian firm-level 
data on production, labour costs, workers and hours, and focusing of the estimation of 
workers/hours elasticities of isoquant and isocost, we find evidence of the declining 
productivity of hours, but also of quasi-fixed labour costs in the range of 20% of total labour 
costs. We also show that industries with larger estimated quasi-fixed labour costs display higher 
annual working hours and make less use of part-time contracts. The tentative conclusion is that 
firms facing large quasi-fixed labour costs are enticed to raise working hours (or oppose their 
reduction), even if this results in lower labour productivity. 
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A renewed interest in reducing working hours has recently been observed in many countries. 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, it has been proposed to combat surging unemployment. It is also 
seen as a desirable corollary to longer careers (i.e. part-time/gradual retirement schemes) that 
governments promote in response to population ageing. The canonical model of labour supply 
states that a worker can flexibly choose his/her own work hours to maximize his or her utility 
at any given wage.1 However, findings from several studies, reviewed by Kuroda &Yamamoto 
(2013), suggest that workers cannot choose work hours freely, or that a change of hours is 
conditional on a job change.2 In this context, and following Pencavel’s call (Pencavel, 2016) 
for more research on the demand of labour3, this paper focusses on the preferences of firms 
regarding the working hours of their employees.  
 
In fact, once that intensive dimension of labour is introduced, firms must make a non-trivial 
decision on the number of workers hired as well as on the hours that are asked from them. A 
profit-maximizing firm will decide on the number of workers to hire and on working hours by 
comparing the productivity and cost of both workers and hours. Labour productivity, whether 
at the intensive or at the extensive margin, has already attracted a lot of interest in the past. A 
first, rather old, stream or the economic literature develops the idea that longer hours lead to 
counterproductive hardship. John Hicks (1932) stated that “probably it has never entered the 
heads of most employers…that hours could be shortened, and output maintained.” A milder 
version of his story is that, as workers slave away for longer and longer, they lose energy, which 
makes them relatively less productive: in other words, the last hours of work still raise total 
output but at a declining rate. In contrast, Feldstein (1965) insists on the importance of "slack" 
hours. He argues that many hours amount to setting-up time, refreshment breaks, time around 
lunch… and deliver no output. These paid-but-non-productive hours do not rise proportionately 
with the number of hours officially worked. An increase in the length of the official working 
day or week could therefore entail a more than proportionate increase in the number of effective 
hours of works. Our empirical work follows the conclusions by Leslie & Wise (1980), or more 
recently by Pencavel (2015) or Collewet & Sauermann (2017) that give credit to the hardship 
story, but it in its mild form: average productivity of hours is decreasing in the number of hours, 
due to the decreasing marginal productivity. This result is however only valid at the observed 
number of hours worked and does not contradict the presence of slack hours for lower number 
of hours worked. 
 
So, could it be that employers have it all wrong when they oppose reducing working hours even 
though it could boost productivity? Not necessarily if, as proposed by Oi (1962), Donaldson & 
Eaton (1984), Dixon & Freebairn (2009) or Kuroda &Yamamoto (2013), the existence of quasi-
fixed labour costs is considered. The main contribution of this work is to shed light on the role 
of quasi-fixed labour costs in understanding firms' demand for hours.  
 
The notion deserves some clarification. Fixed costs of production already benefited from 
attentive scrutiny in the economic literature. They are usually understood as any financial cost 
                                                 
1  Workers' preferences regarding hours have largely been studied in previous work (see for example Barzel 
1973, Freeman & Gottshalk 1998 and more recent work by Rogerson, Keane & Wallenius (2009, 2011, 2012) 
2  For example, in his survey on labor supply, Heckman (1993) concludes that most of the variability in labor 
supply can be explained by extensive margins (i.e., worker flows into and out of the labor market), whereas 
intensive margins (i.e., changes in hours worked) are extremely small. Using job-mover data, Altonji & Paxson 
(1986, 1988, 1992) or Senesky (2004) suggest that choices of wages and hours are available only as a 
‘‘package’’; therefore, a worker is not able to change work hours flexibly unless he or she changes jobs. 
3  The relative importance of the demand for labour has also been highlighted by Bryan (2007) and Stier & 
Lewis-Epstein (2003). 
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– most often corresponding the cost of capital – not dependent on the level of goods or services 
produced. Less often explored, quasi-fixed labour costs are the focus of this paper and arise 
from the explicit modelling of both the intensive and the extensive margin of employment. 
Here, following Hamermesh’s (1993) typology, quasi-fixed labour costs (F) reflect the 
propensity of a worker's compensation to be not strictly indexed on the hours of work delivered 
(H) [but rather on the number of workers N]. That comprises the lump-sum part of pay, non-
proportional taxes or social security contributions, fixed insurance premia, indivisible perks like 
company car, but also recruitment/training or redundancy/firing costs… 
 
Hamermesh distinguished two types of quasi-fixed labour costs. First, the “recurring fixed 
costs” (R).  These are the costs associated with nonwage remuneration and fringe benefits: the 
health insurance, leasing car, paid sickness leave (as well as any other type of leave where the 
worker remains paid while not delivering any hour). Second "one-time fixed cost" (T). In 
Hamermesh's typology these are costs that are paid only once per worker. They typically consist 
of the cost of (externally or internally provided) training, the cost of operating an HR 
department, and dismissal costs. At the level of a firm, the one-time fixed costs will enter F pro 
rata the likelihood q of turnover F=R+qT. By contrast, variable labour costs are those that vary 
with the number of hours; and will typically correspond to the product of hours by an hourly 
wage rate (w(H)H). The total labour cost of a typical firm thus writes C(N,H)= N[w(H)H + F]. 
In the presence of significant labour fixed costs (F), raising the number of hours per worker 
will decrease the average cost and raise profitability ceteris paribus. 
 
Evidence gathered in this paper, using firm-level data covering the whole Belgian private for-
profit economy, suggests both a declining productivity of hours, and a declining average cost 
per additional hour worked. Using annual firm-level data over a 9-year period (2007-2015), we 
show that in the Belgian private economy firms operate around a level of hours per year that is 
synonymous of decreasing average productivity: thus, shorter hours could have a positive effect 
labour productivity (value-added per hour). But analysing the relationship between total labour 
cost and hours, we also find strong evidence of substantial quasi-fixed labour costs (around 20-
23% of total labour costs) suggesting that maximizing firms have an incentive to push hours 
beyond the point where labour productivity is maximal. To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first to examine empirically both the question the productivity of hours and that of their role in 
coping with quasi-fixed labour costs. It is also the first to estimate econometrically (instead of 
just reporting what accounting data reveal) the share of quasi-fixed costs.  
 
One of the tentative conclusions of the paper it that, akin so many other aspects of economic 
life, the decision of firms on working hours amounts to a trade-off: reducing working hours 
might improve labour productivity, but it could also raise average labour cost per hour. A better 
understanding of firms' or industries' incentives to reduce or raise working hours should help 
policy making. For example, to promote part-time employment for the older workers, policy 
makers should prioritize industries with low quasi-fixed labour costs or foster tax and 
compensation policies that ensure that employer costs are as proportional as possible to hours 
of work. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 exposes a model of the profit-
maximising firm that has all power to decide on the number of workers, but also on the number 
of hours each worker must work. The model highlights the likely determinants of the demand 
for workers and working hours, the role of the productivity of hours and that of quasi-fixed 
labour costs. It also suggests a way to identify econometrically the share of fixed labour costs 
as the workers/hours elasticity along the isocost. Section 2 describes the panel of firm-level data 
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that is used. Section 3 exposes our econometric analysis and results. We first present baseline 
estimates of the productivity of working hours and of the share of quasi-fixed labour costs in 
total labour costs. Second, we introduce an industry-by-industry analysis that shows that 
industries with larger quasi-fixed labour costs tend to have higher average working hours higher 
and make less use of part-time work. Section 4 exposes a certain number of robustness checks. 
Section 5 exposes the economic and institutional mechanisms that in the Belgian context 
generate quasi-fixed labour costs. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Working hours as a firm-level decision  
 
Consider a technology where effective labour consists of hours (H) and worker (N), where hours 
of presence (H) do not equal effective hours of labour g(H). The production function is as 
follows:  
 
𝑄𝑄(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) = 𝑓𝑓(𝐾𝐾, 𝐿𝐿) [1.] 
 
𝐿𝐿 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁(𝐻𝐻), 𝑁𝑁′(𝐻𝐻) > 0 [2.] 
 
Assuming that g(H)=H for every possible value of H is probably unrealistic. Doubling hours 
per worker will not double the amount of effective hours/labour. As soon as one lifts the 
assumption of identity, the labour demand can no longer be simply considered as employers 
just choosing an optimal number of worker-hours (i.e. the product N.H equal to L) (Hamermesh 
(1993)) – with the level of H being essentially a matter of workers' preferences in terms of 
revenue versus leisure. In this model we make the opposite assumption that employers are free 
to choose the number of hours worked per worker as well as the number of workers. It is worth 
noting that the specific form for L(N,H) will lead to the absence of scale effect on H*: hours 
worked per worker are independent of the size of the firm (measured by N). 
 
Following Cahuc et al. (2014), we assume firms face the following sequence of choices: first, 
firm choose between hours and workers by minimizing their labour cost, second they choose 
between labour (optimally composed of hours and workers) and capital. This sequential choice 
hypothesis implies that hours versus workers decisions are invariant to firm size and therefore 
separable from capital4.  The employers' problem can then be viewed as one of minimizing 
total labour cost C(N,H) subject to the technological constraint Y≤ f(K, Ng(H)). The optimum 
(H*,N*) is described by a series of FOC that lead after some manipulations to equating the ratio 
of marginal productivities to the ratio of marginal labour costs: 
 
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
= 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁
 [3.] 
 
or equivalently using [2] and assuming that the true generating process for labour cost is: 
 
𝐶𝐶(𝑁𝑁,𝐻𝐻) = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +  𝑁𝑁[𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻 + 𝐹𝐹]  [4.] 
 
                                                 
4  The sequence of choice has been documented before and it seems realistic to think that capital/labour ratio 
decisions are subject to a different timing than hours/workers decisions. Would this assumption be lifted, the 
final signs of derivatives would be indeterminate and depend on capital, workers and hours complementarity 
(Hart, 1984). 
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where  
w(H) is the hourly wage (“variable labour costs”) and rises with H (w'>0) to reflect, 
among other, the legal obligation to pay more for extra hours. Modelling the overtime 
premium as a continuous increasing hourly wage function allows to compute elasticities 
that we will be able to estimate in the dataset. The alternative modelling option is to 
have an overtime premium paid per hour above a legal threshold, however our data 
would not allow us to estimate the increase in remuneration at the threshold5. 
 
F are labour quasi-fixed costs (i.e. costs that are invariant to the number of hours per 
worker, but vary with the number of workers). A version of the model explicitly 
modelling quasi-fixed costs as non-proportional to hours worked instead of perfectly 
fixed is presented in Appendix A. The key predictions of the model remain unchanged. 
 
FF are firm-level fixed costs (i.e. costs that are invariant to the number of workers 
(human resources personnel, administrative procedures vis-à-vis insurers, public 
authorities…)). 
 
we get  
 
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
=  𝑁𝑁𝑔𝑔′(𝐻𝐻)
𝑔𝑔(𝐻𝐻) = 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 =  𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤′(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻 + 𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻 + 𝐹𝐹  [5.] 
 
One can also restate the equilibrium using the implicit function theorem6, where the ratio of 
marginal productivities 𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁⁄  is equal to the slope of the isoquant:  
 
−
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
= 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻│𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿=0
 [6.] 
 
And multiplying by 𝐻𝐻 𝑁𝑁⁄  leads to the elasticity along the isoquant σ(H, N): 
 
−
𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁
𝐿𝐿𝐻𝐻
𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁
= 𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻│𝑑𝑑𝐿𝐿=0
= −𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) [7.] 
 
Similarly, the ratio of hours and men marginal labour cost  𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁⁄ can be related to the elasticity 
of substitution along the isocost 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁): 
 
−
𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁
𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻
𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁
= 𝐻𝐻
𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁
𝑑𝑑𝐻𝐻│𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶=0
= −𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) [8.] 
 
Thus, as alternative to [3], the optimum N*, H*can be described as the equality of the slopes of 
the isoquant/isocost in the (N, H) space; or the equality of the elasticities of hours per worker 
along both the isoquant and isocost (Dixon et al., 2005): 
 
𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) =  𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) [9.] 
 
                                                 
5  In fact, modelling labour cost as wH + p(H-H0)+ F will lead to the right-hand side of equation to 5 to simply 
be the ratio of variable over total cost per hour worked for all H>H0. 
6  dL=0= LH dH+ LNdN 
  
 
 
6 
or equivalently, given [2] and [4]: 
 
𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) =  𝑁𝑁′(𝐻𝐻)𝑁𝑁(𝐻𝐻)
𝐻𝐻
= 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) = 1 + 𝜀𝜀1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  [10.] 
 
where: 
𝜀𝜀 ≡
𝑤𝑤′(𝐻𝐻)
𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)
𝐻𝐻
 the elasticity of hourly wage to working hours; 
𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹 ≡  𝐹𝐹
𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻 the ratio of fixed to variable worker-level labour costs. 
 
Note incidentally that if 𝜀𝜀 = 0 (i.e. hourly wages are not affected by H), then, assuming [4], (1 − 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁)) boils down to [1 − (1 (1 + 𝐹𝐹 𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻⁄⁄ ))] or equivalently [𝐹𝐹 (𝐹𝐹 + 𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻⁄ )]. 
Hence, the more 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) is inferior to 1, the higher the share of fixed costs in total labour costs. 
In what follows, [1 − 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁)] will interpreted as a (lower-bound) estimate of the share of 
quasi-fixed labour costs in total labour costs. 
 
Equation [10] means that H* is such that the ratio of its marginal to average productivity [𝑁𝑁′(𝐻𝐻) 𝑁𝑁(𝐻𝐻) 𝐻𝐻⁄⁄ ] equals [1 + 𝜀𝜀(𝐻𝐻) 1 + 𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹⁄ ]. The higher fixed costs relative to the sensitivity 
of wage rate to hours, the more likely 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) will be inferior to 1 (in absolute value). 
Simultaneously, if that is the case employers will push for longer hours; certainly, beyond the 
point where marginal productivity starts declining (presumably due to hardship, lassitude…), 
and beyond the point where average productivity of hours reaches its maximum (Figure 2)7. 
Said differently, the only reason for firms to push working hours to the point where average 
productivity is declining, is that they must recuperate fixed costs. 
 
This finally leads to positing that the (conditional) labour demand for working hours looks like: 
 
𝐻𝐻∗ ≡ 𝑚𝑚�𝑄𝑄⏞
+ ,𝜎𝜎⏞−� = 𝑛𝑛 �𝑄𝑄⏞+ , 𝛾𝛾⏞−� =  𝑛𝑛(𝑄𝑄⏞+ ,𝐹𝐹⏞+ , 𝜀𝜀⏞−)  [11.] 
 
                                                 
7  Mathematically, the sign of the slope (or derivative) of the average productivity is determined by the difference 
between the average productivity and the marginal productivity. It the latter is smaller than the former (i.e. if 
σ(H)<1) we necessarily have a negative slope for the average productivity, meaning that we are beyond its 
maximum. And marginal productivity of hours is declining (Figure 2, upper part).  
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Figure 2 – Optimal hours, ratio of marginal to average productivity of hours and quasi-fixed 
labour costs (F1>F0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Data  
 
The data we use in this paper essentially come from Bel-First (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, Figures 1a 
and 1b),8 that all for-profit firms located in Belgium must feed to comply with the legal 
prescriptions on income declaration. It consists in a large unbalanced panel of 115,337 firm-
year observations corresponding to the situation of 14,544 firms with at least 20 employees, 
from all industries forming the for-profit Belgian private economy9, in the period 2007– 
201510. Our dataset comprises a large variety of firms. First along the firm size dimension, we 
include all data for firms from 20 workers (FTE) to very large firms (above 1,000 workers), 
corresponding to well-known international companies11. These firms are largely documented 
in terms of industry (NACE12 or NAICS13), size (number of workers), capital used (total 
equity), total labour cost (more on this below) and productivity (value added). 
 
Descriptive statistics on this large sample are reported in Tables 1 to 4. One of the originalities 
of this paper is to consider both the productivity and the labour cost of hours and workers. Table 
                                                 
8  http://www.bvdinfo.com/Products/Company-Information/National/Bel-First.aspx 
9  We remove the primary sector (agriculture and mining) as well as the public/non-profit industry (NACE 1-
digit codes "A","B","O","P","T","U"). 
10  The analysis has also been performed on 2005-2014 data without any impact on the conclusions. 
11  Such as Volvo, Arcelor, Audi, GSK, Electrabel, Colruyt, Delhaize, Carrefour, AIB-Vinçotte and 10 large 
interim firms (Randstad, Adecco, Start People, T-Groep, Tempo Team, Daoust, Manpower, …). 
12  European industrial activity classification (Nomenclature scientifique des Activité économiques dans la 
Communauté Européenne) 
13  North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)  
H
H 
g’(H) marginal 
productivity 
g(H)/H average  productivity 
H
H 
σ= g’(H)/(g(H)/H)  
H*F0 
1 
𝛾𝛾 =(1+ε(H))/(1+rF0) 
𝜸𝜸 =(1+ε(H))/(1+rF1) 
H*F1 
Productivity 
in value 
σ and 𝜸𝜸 in 
value 
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2 contains descriptive statistics on productivity (Q/N where Q is value-added) and average 
labour costs (C/N). The latter is logically inferior to productivity.   
 
In this paper, labour costs are measured as a firm-level aggregate independently from 
production. They include the value of all wage and nonwage compensations paid to or on behalf 
of the total labour force (both full- and part-time plus interim/temporary workers) on an annual 
basis. Labour costs comprise: annual gross wage (including end-of-the year bonuses, paid 
holiday/sickness/maternity leave), employees' social contributions (representing 13.07% of 
gross wage), employers' contributions to social security (38% of the gross wage), employers' 
contributions to extra-legal insurances and pensions, stocks and other (taxable) perks like "meal 
vouchers", company car, mobile phone… Most of the costs of externally provided training are 
included in the firms' total labour cost used here14.  
And so are Belgium's notoriously high severance payments including the special regimes 
applicable to older workers15 16.  
 
All in all, the firm-level aggregate that we use is thus likely to capture most of the "recurrent" 
and "one-time" quasi-fixed costs mentioned in the introduction. Still there is a need of an in-
depth analysis of which of these items can be considered as genuinely "fixed" (see Section 5 
for this). An exception are recruitment/search costs and those of internally provided training 
are unlikely to be included as they are not ascribed to workers and appear in the books as 
intermediates. Internal training costs, as well as those of HR departments involved in search 
and recruitment are unlikely to appear in our data a fixed labour costs. This is because they 
essentially take the form of wages paid to specialised workers (who also deliver a certain 
number of hours); just like any other employee of the firms. In our data, there is no way to 
isolate their labour cost.  
Of crucial importance in this paper is the distinction between the number of workers (N) and 
the number of hours (H) (Table 2 right-hand columns, Table 3). The former is simply the 
headcount, or more precisely the average over the year of the headcount at the end of each 
month. The latter corresponds to the number of worked and paid hours over the year17. It does 
not consider unpaid overtime, holidays, sick leaves, short-term absences, and hours lost due to 
strikes or for any other reasons.  
 
The average hours worked varies strongly in our sample; even within full-time workers 
(Figure 1a,b). The standard deviation of hours worked (overall or for full-time workers only) 
within firm is only slightly smaller than between firms (Table 4). Generally, we observe non-
negligible variation of both hours and workers within firm, over time representing more than 
                                                 
14  Account 648 "Other Personnel Expenses"; 
15  By contrast, the cost of workers in a pre-retirement scheme are not counted anymore when fully retired. If 
partially retired (“aménagement de fin de carrière”), they count as part-time workers; and the worker replacing 
them for the other part-time is counted.   
16  Unemployment with complement paid by the former employer ("complément d’entreprise"); account 624 
Retirement and survival pensions.  
17  Unlike hours found in the social security database, Belfirst data on hours do no suffer from the "assimilation" 
bias: i.e. hours that are assimilated to worked hours in the definition of social (e.g. pension) rights. The only 
serious issue with Bel-first is thus the underestimation of worked hours due to unpaid overtime (something 
this seems to be common among white collar workers). 
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30% of total variation18. This observation of large within-firm variations is important to allow 
form meaningful firm-level fixed effects regressions in the subsequent econometric analysis. 
 
In the extension of the main econometric analysis (Section 4) we also use individual-level 
international data from PIAAC19. 
 
Table 1: Bel-first. Number of firms 
Year Number of 
firms 
2007 11,944 
2008 12,213 
2009 12,369 
2010 12,698 
2011 12,949 
2012 13,272 
2013 13,365 
2014 13,370 
2015 13,157 
Nobs 115,337 
Total #firms 14,544 
Source: Bel-First (2016) 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, main variables 
Year 
 
Avg 
Value 
added 
per 
empl. 
Q/N 
[EUR] 
Avg 
Labour 
cost per 
empl. C/N 
[EUR] 
Avg 
Capital per 
empl. 
[EUR] 
Hours and workers (mean) 
Hours 
per 
empl. 
[annual] 
H 
Workers 
full time 
N ft 
Workers 
part 
time 
N pt 
Workers 
interim/temp 
N int 
2007 77,133.03 43,237.04 325,163.3 1,472.4 80.38 24.78 14.57 
2008 78,996.69 44,680.06 413,030.7 1,472.4 80.77 24.83 12.98 
2009 73,856.15 45,153.60 426,619.2 1,428.4 76.80 24.97 11.51 
2010 76,494.41 45,898.61 322,024.1 1,433.2 74.66 25.57 12.59 
2011 79,430.76 47,709.65 610,067.9 1,437.2 76.33 27.14 12.28 
2012 76,136.48 49,003.94 639,064.7 1,427.9 75.78 28.02 12.57 
2013 76,403.06 49,705.03 485,220.0 1,422.4 75.44 29.02 12.81 
2014 77,347.08 50,599.59 462,562.8 1,427.7 90.82 36.38 12.37 
2015 79,568.47 50,779.37 329,668.3 1,430.1 75.33 37.95 13.67 
All years 77,269.98 47,517.51 447,715.7 1,438.5 78.49 28.87 12.81 
N obs 115,337       
Source: Bel-first (2016) 
 
                                                 
18  Even after removing outliers: i.e. firms declaring hours per worker to be, on average over all workers, below 
100 or above 3000 annual hours, mostly due to encoding errors. 
19  The Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics, Workers and hours: details (percentiles). 
Moment 
 
Number 
of 
workers. 
(N) 
Av. 
hours 
[full-time 
w.]  
(H ft) 
Av. hours 
[part-time 
w.] (H pt) 
Av. hours 
[interim 
w.] (H int) 
Share 
of full-
time w.$ 
Share of 
part-time 
w. $ 
Share 
of 
interim 
w. $ 
p25 27.00 1,464.92 857.25 1,634.33 0.68 0.06 0.00 
p50 40.00 1,581.86 1,044.60 1,883.59 0.83 0.12 0.00 
p75 74.00 1,666.90 1,201.75 2,004.15 0.92 0.27 0.03 
p99 1,169.00 2,438.83 1,859.00 2,742.00 1.00 0.97 0.33 
Mean 112.06 1,563.63 1,022.38 1,791.26 0.75 0.22 0.03 
Nobs 115,337       
Source: Bel-first (2016), $ in total number of workers 
 
Figure 1a- Annual average working hours per worker. Distribution across firms. Belgium 
private economy 2007-2015. 
 
Source: Bel-first (2016) 
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Figure 1b- Annual average working hours per worker [full-time workers only]. Distribution 
across firms. Belgium private economy 2007-2015 
 
Source: Bel-first (2016) 
 
Table 4 – Importance of within [over time] vs between [across] firm variation of employment 
and hours 
 Number of 
workers  
(N) 
Working hours 
(H) 
Working hours FT 
(HFT) 
Std_error (between) [a] 454.15 281.62 207.00 
Std_error (within) [b] 686.73 185.31 188.67 
Within share of total 
var. [b]2/([a]2+[b]2) 
0.696 0.302 0.454 
Source: Bel-first 
 
3. Econometric analysis of firm-level data 
 
In this section, using firm-level panel data, we estimate both production and labour cost 
functions20 with the aim of assessing the productivity of working hours and the (relative) 
importance of quasi-fixed labour costs. We do so using firm level data and, in a robustness 
analysis, using individual-level international data. The latter can only be used to detect the 
presence of quasi-fixed labour costs (see Section 4.1) by exploiting the cross-individual 
variation of the number of hours. The advantage of firm-level data is that workers and hours 
can be analysed simultaneously. And as the data consist of panels, they can be used to control 
for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity as well as for the risk of simultaneity bias (both being 
                                                 
20  Not to be confounded with a the traditional [production] cost function i.e. a function of input prices and output 
quantity. 
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synonymous to endogeneity). What is more, the dataset is sufficiently large to allow for: i) the 
identification of cross-industry differences (in terms of 𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁), 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁)) and ii) an 
econometric analysis of these differences’ impact in terms of duration of hours or the incidence 
of part-time work (Section 4.2). 
  
3.1. Firm-level evidence on the productivity of hours and quasi-fixed labour costs 
 
i) Identification strategy  
 
The simple model, spelled out in Section 1, suggests that hours worked per worker are 
determined at the firm level by the equality of the elasticity along the workers-hours isoquant 
curve 𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) to the elasticity along the isocost curve 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁), assuming firms operate at their 
cost-minimisation optimum. 
 
We use Belgian annual firm-level data on total labour cost (wages, contributions to social 
security and paid holidays, annual bonuses, …) alongside information about annual hours and 
number of workers in each of the firms present in the dataset. As we do not observe fixed costs 
𝐹𝐹 and the elasticity of unit wage to hours worked 𝜀𝜀, there is no way we can directly compute 
𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) as specified in [10]. The same applies for 𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁). But these elasticities can be 
retrieved by the estimation nth order polynomial approximations of (the log of) 𝐶𝐶(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁)) and 
𝑄𝑄(𝐾𝐾,𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) respectively. In the case of 2nd order approximations (i.e. translog specification) we 
have 
 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≈ 𝐴𝐴 + 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 12 𝜒𝜒1ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 12 𝜒𝜒2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜒𝜒3ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  [12.] 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≈ 𝐵𝐵 + 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜋𝜋ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  12𝜓𝜓1ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 12𝜓𝜓2𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 + 𝜓𝜓3ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  [13.] 
 
where lower case c, q, h, n correspond to the log of C, Q, H, N respectively, Tt are time dummies, 
and vit, μit the residuals. 
 
The derivatives of these translogs vis-à-vis n and h are equal [ignoring firm and time indices] 
to: 
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁
 = 𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶
𝑁𝑁�
 ≈ 𝜃𝜃 +  𝜒𝜒2 𝑛𝑛 +  𝜒𝜒3ℎ [14.] 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ
=  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐶𝐶
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
 = 𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶
𝐻𝐻�
 ≈ 𝜆𝜆 +  𝜒𝜒1 ℎ +  𝜒𝜒3𝑛𝑛 [15.]  
 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁
 = 𝜕𝜕𝑁𝑁𝜕𝜕
𝑁𝑁�
 ≈ 𝛽𝛽 +  𝜓𝜓2 𝑛𝑛 +  𝜓𝜓3ℎ [16.] 
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ
=  𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻
 = 𝜕𝜕𝐻𝐻𝜕𝜕
𝐻𝐻�
 ≈ 𝜋𝜋 +  𝜓𝜓1 ℎ +  𝜓𝜓3𝑛𝑛 [17.] 
 
and thus following [7], [8] the elasticities along the isocost/isoquant can be approximated using 
the estimated parameters of [12], [13]:  
 
𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) ≡  𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  ≈  𝜆𝜆 + 𝜒𝜒1 ℎ+ 𝜒𝜒3𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃 + 𝜒𝜒2 𝑛𝑛+ 𝜒𝜒3ℎ [18.] 
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𝜎𝜎(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) ≡  𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝑄𝑄𝐻𝐻𝑄𝑄𝑁𝑁  ≈  𝜋𝜋 + 𝜓𝜓1 ℎ+ 𝜓𝜓3𝑛𝑛𝛽𝛽 + 𝜓𝜓2 𝑛𝑛+ 𝜓𝜓3ℎ [19.] 
 
In particular, with a true cost function [4] C(N,H) = FF + N(wH + F) and using [10] 
 
𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) ≡  𝐻𝐻𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁  =  𝜆𝜆 + 𝜒𝜒1 ℎ+ 𝜒𝜒3𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃 + 𝜒𝜒2 𝑛𝑛+ 𝜒𝜒3ℎ ≈ 1+ ε1+𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹  [20.] 
 
or equivalently, if unit wages do not vary with hours (i.e. ε=0) we get and estimation for the 
share of fixed costs in total labour cost of an employee as: 
 1 − 𝛾𝛾(𝐻𝐻,𝑁𝑁) = 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹+𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)𝐻𝐻 ≈ 1 − 𝜆𝜆 + 𝜒𝜒1 ℎ+ 𝜒𝜒3𝑛𝑛𝜃𝜃 + 𝜒𝜒2 𝑛𝑛+ 𝜒𝜒3ℎ [21.] 
 
Note that expressions [18], [19] boil down to [respectively] λ/θ [π/β] when χ's [ψ's] are null 
(i.e. 1st order polynomial approximation also equivalent to the Cobb-Douglas specification).  
 
Note finally that all our estimates allow for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. residuals 
μit= ωi+ρit; [and similarly for the residual of the cost function], with ωi being a time-invariant 
firm-level unobserved term potentially correlated with outcome variables and labour ones. In 
subsequent developments we also allow for simultaneity bias; i.e. μit= ωit + ρit with ωit being a 
time-variant unobserved term (corresponding e.g. to partially anticipated demand chocks) also 
potentially correlated simultaneously to output and labour decisions (Levinsohn & Petrin, 2003; 
Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer, 2015). 
 
ii) Results 
 
A first set of key results are presented in Table 5. Estimated coefficients using firm-level mean-
centred variables21 – corresponding to equations [12], [13], but also order 1 simplifications or 
order 3 generalisations – are reported in the upper part of the Table whereas the implied 
elasticities 𝛾𝛾(nit,hit) [18] σ(nit,hit) [19] along (respectively) the isoquant and the isocost are 
reported in the lower part of the table. Focusing on the latter, we can see that they are 
systematically (and statistically significantly) inferior to 1. For instance, the model delivers a 
value of σ= .80, in line with results of the literature on the elasticity of output to hours (Leslie 
& Wise, 1980; Anxo & Bigsten, 1989; Cahuc et al., 2014; Cette et al., 2015).  The OLS model 
and FE effects model using first-differenced data (Table 5a, 5b) are presented in the Appendix 
and deliver estimates qualitatively similar. 
 
In Table 6, we exploit the fact that our data permit replicating the labour cost analysis [using 
FE-first differences] for three types of employment contracts: full-time (forming the largest part 
of the total), part-time and interim/temporary. Two interesting results emerge. First, all types 
of contracts are associated to quasi-fixed labour costs as all estimated 𝛾𝛾 are statistically inferior 
to 1. Second, conditional on hourly wage elasticity (ε) to be similar across types, fixed costs 
appear significantly higher for full-time employees: at least 34% compared to 15.4% and 5.4% 
                                                 
21  The mean-centered variables that we use are the original/untransformed ones. Our model writes y(xit)=f(xit)+ 
ωi+ρit . Mean-centering yit- 𝑦𝑦�i =f(xit)- 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖)�������� +ρit-?̅?𝜌i  eliminates (endogenous) fixed effect ωi . But neither f(.) 
nor 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖)��������  are observed. For  f(xit), we resort to polynomial approximation. In the case of a 2nd degree 
approximation, we have that for value xit expected outcome is given   f(xit)≃α + β xit + γ xit2 . Similarly the 
expected outcome value in ?̅?𝑥i is given  by f(?̅?𝑥i) ≃ α + β ?̅?𝑥i + γ ?̅?𝑥i 2 . Assuming further that  𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥𝚤𝚤𝑖𝑖)��������≃ α + β ?̅?𝑥i + 
γ ?̅?𝑥i 2 we have that yit- 𝑦𝑦�i≃ β(xit- ?̅?𝑥i)+ γ(xit2- ?̅?𝑥i 2) +ρit-?̅?𝜌i   
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for part-timers and interims respectively. This result is in line with the model’s prediction that 
job positions that are associated with higher quasi-fixed costs should be filled with full-time 
workers whereas part-timers should only be hired when quasi-fixed costs are relatively lower. 
Results regarding temporary workers should be interpreted with caution as the data for such 
workers is much weaker: only a small proportion of firms report the presence of temporary 
workers and the reporting is based on hours invoiced by the interim company. 
 
In Table 7, we explore the varying importance of quasi-fixed labour costs across broadly 
defined (NACE1) and contrasted industries: manufacturing, retail and 
accommodation/restaurants. The analysis is done separately for the 3 industries, using FE-first 
differences. Conditional on hourly wage elasticity (ε) to be uniformly distributed, fixed costs 
appear to be significantly higher in manufacturing (at least 40%) compared to retail and 
accommodation/restaurants (26% and 21% respectively). These differences can reflect 
differences in the labour cost structure between sectors due to for example historically different 
institutional arrangements and more details on what exactly drives our measure of fixed labour 
costs are given in section 5. For further results on industry by industry results, see section 3.2 
below. 
 
In Table 8, we present the results when endogeneity stems both from fixed effects (unobserved 
time-invariant firm heterogeneity) and simultaneity (unobserved, final demand-related, short-
run shocks that can affect simultaneously outcomes variables and the level of labour inputs).22 
To control for that risk we implement the more structural approach developed by Levinsohn & 
Petrin (2003) and more recently by Ackerberg et al. (2015) (ACF hereafter), which primarily 
consists of using intermediate inputs (materials and other supplies…) to proxy short-term 
shocks. Results are qualitatively very similar to the ones reported in previous tables where we 
control only for fixed effects. Even though this suggests that simultaneity is a relatively benign 
problem in our data, coefficients in Table 8 are our most robust and thus preferred ones. 
Referring to Table 8’s ACF results23, the tentative conclusion would be that quasi-fixed labour 
costs account for at least 23% of total labour costs. As far as we know, this has never been 
estimated econometrically so far. 
 
More generally, it should be noted for all tables that our contribution resides principally in the 
correct estimation of elasticities along the isoquant (σ) and the isocost (𝛾𝛾) to be both 
significantly lower than one. Estimations along the isoquant are not new and should be 
understood as the demonstration that our database yields results aligned with the existing 
empirical literature. On the other hand, results regarding the isocost have not be shown before 
and represent an important contribution to the literature on labour demand. Finally, even though 
the theoretic model predicts perfect alignment of σ and 𝛾𝛾, our regression models are not built 
to test such a prediction and the close values we obtain econometrically should only be 
interpreted as global coherence in our results. 
 
                                                 
22  For instance, the simultaneity of a negative shock (due to the loss of a major contract) and a reduction of hours 
worked, causing reverse causality: from productivity drop to hours contraction.  Alternatively, focusing on the 
estimation of the labour cost function, the simultaneity between a positive shock (ex: the landing of a big 
contract, triggering an overall rise of wages) and a rise of the number of hours worked, also causing a reverse 
causality problem [in particular a shock-driven rise of hourly wage elasticity (ε) that may translate into γ being 
underestimated]. 
23  See Vandenberghe (2017) for a full presentation of the LP and ACF proxy-variable idea, and (Vandenberghe 
et al., 2013) for how it can be combined with fixed-effects. 
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Table 5 – Econometric estimation of the productivity of hours and of the (relative) importance of 
quasi-fixed labour costs – Fixed effect as mean centring 
 
 1st order approximation 2nd order approximation 3nd order approximation 
 Productivity Labour 
cost 
Productivity Labour 
cost 
Productivity Labour 
cost 
kit≡ln(Kit) 0.0878***  0.0864***  0.0853***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
nit≡ln(Nit) 0.779*** 0.926*** 0.788*** 0.930*** 0.800*** 0.933*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
hit≡ln(Hit) 0.627*** 0.711*** 0.672*** 0.746*** 0.687*** 0.759*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
nit2   -0.00159 -0.00973*** -0.00421* -0.00150 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
hit2   0.0830*** 0.0699*** -0.0388*** -0.0678*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
nit hit   0.0908*** 0.0805*** -0.0344*** -0.0367*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
nit3     -0.00444*** 0.00159*** 
     (0.001) (0.000) 
hit3     -0.0270*** -0.0307*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
nit2hit     -0.0189*** -0.00997*** 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
nit hit2     -0.0422*** -0.0412*** 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
Controls Control: year, province, join commission and industry(NAICS 4-digit) 
R2 .83 .92 .83 .92 .83 .92 
Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost/isoquant 
σ;γ 0.80 0.77 0.67 0.75 0.68 0.76 
Prob=1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6-  Econometric estimation of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed labour costs. Breakdown 
by type of contract (full-time, part-time and interim) 
 
 FE (first diff.) 
 All types of 
workers 
Full-time  
workers 
Part-time 
workers 
Interim 
workers 
nit 0.815*** 0.862*** 0.938*** 0.974*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
hit 0.642*** 0.657*** 0.845*** 0.946*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
nit2 0.0392*** 0.0308*** 0.00744*** 0.00388* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
hit2 -0.00771*** 0.00261* -0.0147*** 0.00112 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
nit hit 0.0326*** 0.0378*** -0.00553 -0.00274 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Controls Control: year and firm fixed effects 
R2 .6 .56 .56 .86 
 Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost 
γ 0.645 0.660 0.846 0.946 
prob=1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note that only large firms are required to report information on temporary workers’ hours and cost separately.24 
 
 
Table 7- Econometric estimation of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed labour costs. Breakdown 
by broadly defined industries (Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail and Accommodation and 
Restaurants) 
 
 FE (first diff.) 
 All industries Manufacturing Wholesale & 
Retail 
Accommodation & 
Restaurants 
nit 0.815*** 0.775*** 0.841*** 0.822*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
hit 0.642*** 0.594*** 0.732*** 0.780*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
nit2 0.0392*** 0.0568*** 0.0456*** 0.0185*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
hit2 -0.00771*** -0.00730*** 0.0169*** -0.00947 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
nit hit 0.0326*** 0.0548*** 0.0644*** 0.00862 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
Controls Control: year and firm fixed effects 
R2 .6 .64 .53 .79 
 Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost 
γ 0.645 0.596 0.736 0.781 
prob=1 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
                                                 
24  Large firms are firms with more than 100 workers, or firms exceeding 2 of the following thresholds: 50 FTE 
workers, 7.300.000€ turnover, 3.650.000€ total balance sheet. 
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Table 8 - Econometric estimation of the productivity of hours and of the (relative) importance of 
quasi-fixed labour costs. Fixed effect as mean centring + accounting for simultaneity bias 
 
 LP£ ACF$ 
 Productivity Labour costs Productivity Labour costs 
Nit 0.645*** 0.684*** 0.756*** 0.914*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) 
Hit 0.475*** 0.464*** 0.564*** 0.701*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.063) (0.052) 
Controls Year and firm fixed effects [and (log of) capital in productivity equation] 
 
 Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost/isoquant 
σ; γ .74 .68 .74 .77 
prob=1 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
£: Levinsohn-Petrin; $ Ackerberg, Caves & Frazer 
Cobb-Douglas specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
3.2. Industry-level analysis of the impact of quasi-fixed costs on the demand for hours 
 
In this section, we derive distinct estimates of 𝛾𝛾(N,H) and σ(N,H) for each of the NACE 3-digit 
industries in our data set. We first estimate our productivity and labour cost equations separately 
for each industry25. Results are reported in Table 10 (in the Appendix) and can be visualized 
on Figure 3. The latter suggests that the two estimates are strongly correlated but not necessarily 
perfectly aligned. Values of 𝜎𝜎; 𝛾𝛾�  < 1 hint at the presence of quasi-fixed labour costs whose effect 
dominates those of longer hours on unit wage (ε≥0). Note that most of the large industries 
(representing more firms and revealed by the size of the circles on Fig.3) display elasticities 
that are significantly inferior to 1; an indication of the relative importance of quasi-fixed labour 
costs. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
25  Using 2nd order polynomial approximations, fixed effect as first differences 
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Figure 3- Industry by industry estimation of 𝛾𝛾 and σ  
 
2nd order polynomial specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H) 
 
 
More related to the point at the core of this paper, using these estimates 𝛾𝛾� and 𝜎𝜎� as predictors 
of (conditional) labour demand equations [11] yields the theoretically expected results (see 
Table 9, left part). The higher 𝛾𝛾� (i.e. the lower the estimated share of fixed costs), the lower the 
average annual number of hours (Tab 9, col 3 & Fig 4), and also the higher the share of workers 
with a part-time contract (Tab 9, col 3 & Fig 5). 
 
 
Table 9 - Econometric Results – Impact of industry-level elasticity on working hours and prevalence 
(share) of part-time work contract; using industry by industry estimated 𝜎𝜎�j;𝛾𝛾�j 
[FE (first diff.) and 2nd order polynomial specification of Q(N,H) and C(N,H)] 
 
 Productivity Labour costs 
 Working hours Share part-time  
contracts 
Working hours Share part-time  
contracts 
𝜎𝜎�j;𝛾𝛾� j -0.163*** 0.0848*** -0.115*** 0.00512*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls Year fixed effect, 
output (log) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure 4 – Working hours in 2015 as a function of industry-level estimated isocost elasticity 
(𝛾𝛾�j) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Share of part-time work in 2015 as of industry-level estimated isocost elasticity(𝛾𝛾�j) 
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4. Robustness checks  
 
4.1.  Econometric analysis of worker-level wage data to estimate labour costs. 
 
In this section, we use PIAAC 2012 data26 on average gross wage per hour (HC) and hours of 
work per week (H) from the individuals who work as employees in the private, for-profit 
segment of the economy. By definition, PIAAC aims at delivering comparable international 
data. It is analysed here with the aim of assess how Belgian quasi-fixed labour costs compare 
with the situation in other countries. PIAAC contains only individual-level data so there is no 
way one can replicate the productivity & labour cost analysis of the previous sections. And as 
in the above sections, the objective is to infer the presence (and the importance) of quasi-fixed 
labour costs F from the parameters of an econometric models regressing labour cost on hours.  
 
As in Section 3.1 we assume that HC(H)=(wH+F)/H= w+F/H. We do not observe unit wage 
w or fixed labour cost F. But elasticities can be retrieved by the estimation of a linear27 
approximation of the log of HC(H) i.e.:  
 
ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≈ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝜙𝜙𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  [22.] 
 
where hcik is the (log of) the average gross wage per hour reported by worker i in country k and 
hik the (log) of number of hours per week the worker declares. Assuming the actual process 
generating wages is HC= (w+F/H); [ignoring individual and country indices] we have that  
 
𝜕𝜕ℎ𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕ℎ
= 𝜕𝜕ln(𝐻𝐻𝐶𝐶)
𝜕𝜕ln(𝐻𝐻)  = − 𝐹𝐹𝐻𝐻2+𝑤𝑤′(𝐻𝐻)𝐹𝐹
𝐻𝐻2
+
𝑤𝑤(𝐻𝐻)
𝐻𝐻
 ≈  𝜙𝜙 [23.] 
 
which is negative [i.e. gross wage per hour go down with hours] if F>0 and if w'(H) is relatively 
small or null. In the particular case where w'(H) ≈0 [i.e. no or little rise of the wage rate with 
hours it is immediate to show that δhc/δh = -F/(F+wH) ≈ ϕ. This means that the estimation of 
[22] delivers coefficients that can be used to estimate the share of quasi-fixed labour costs. 
Indeed, – ϕ is a lower bound proxy of the importance of quasi-fixed costs. 
 
Of course, the level of hourly gross wage of an individual worker reflects many things that have 
little to do with the number of working hours. As PIAAC is not a panel, there is no way to resort 
to fixed effects (FE) to account for unobserved heterogeneity. What we do is to specify πik as a 
vector of controls comprising many of the determinants of wage: educational attainment, 
gender, labour market experience, labour market experience squared, occupation (ISCO 2008 
2-digit) industry (ISIC 2-digit). We also include the respondent's average test score in literacy, 
numeracy and problem solving (which turns out to be a key determinant of wage, given Table 
10’s results). The hope is that this rather rich set of controls allows for a proper identification 
of actual gross wage/hours elasticity ϕ, and thus of the (relative) importance of quasi-fixed 
labour costs.  
 
                                                 
26  The OECD led Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) 
27  The estimation was conducted using quadratic and cubic approximations. Results were qualitatively similar 
to that reported hereafter. 
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Results (Appendix, Table 11) clearly hint at the presence of quasi-fixed labour costs. With an 
estimated ϕ =-.18 for Belgium we may conclude that fixed costs are at least equal to 18% of 
total gross wage of a typical private- and for-profit economy employee28. The figure of 0.18% 
is also very similar to the values estimated using Belgium-only firm-level data in the previous 
sections. We read PIAAC results as reinforcing the overall plausibility of the firm-level 
evidence presented above. 
 
4.2.  Descriptive/accounting evidence about the share of quasi-fixed labour cost (and 
their impact on the demand for hours) 
 
Another robustness assessment of our Section 3 econometric estimates of the share of quasi-
fixed labour costs comes from the comparison with direct estimates of that share, based on 
accounting/descriptive data. In general, authors consider both "one-time" fixed costs (i.e. 
recruitment, training, severance) and "recurrent" fixed labour costs i.e. employer-funded 
unemployment, medical insurance or retirement plans (social security), remuneration of non-
worked days (annual holiday, sick or maternity leave), and other in-kind employee benefits 
(stocks, cars, phones…). 
 
Summing up these items, several authors report values that are surprisingly close to 20%. Hart 
(1984), suggests that for both the United States and the United Kingdom it is reasonable to put 
quasi-fixed labour costs at roughly 20 percent of total cost. For Ehrenberg (2016), the [USA] 
data suggest that around 19 percent of total compensation (about 60 percent of nonwage costs) 
is quasi fixed. Martins (2004), in a study for Portugal, estimates quasi-fixed costs at 25 per cent 
of labour costs, with social security payments are the dominant quasi-fixed cost item. 
 
Finally, there is a small literature that used descriptive estimates of quasi-fixed labour costs as 
predictor of firms' behaviour. Cutler & Madrian (1998) find that increases in health insurance 
costs during the 1980s increased the hours of covered workers. Montgomery & Cosgrove 
(1993) and Buchmueller (1999) show that a smaller proportion of hours are worked by part-
time employees in firms offering more generous fringe benefits to full-time workers. Finally, 
Dolfin (2006) uses US data on the cost of recruiting, search, hiring, training, and firing and 
shows that these increase employee hours ceteris paribus. The results of these studies are 
consistent with our results in Section 3.2. based on inferred/indirect measures of quasi-fixed 
labour costs. More generally, they accord with the idea of substitution of hours for workers in 
response to rising quasi-fixed costs, as predicted by a theory of labour demand.  
5. The economic and institutional factors underpinning quasi-
fixed labour cost in the Belgian context 
 
In this final section, we describe what may drive quasi-fixed labour costs in the specific context 
of Belgium. There is not much to say about 'one-time fixed costs': recruitment, firing/severance 
and training costs. Like in the case of other advanced economies, these exist in Belgium and 
are unambiguously "fixed". The singularity of Belgium is that its severance costs -- particularly 
for white-collar workers -- are very high and may be a significant contributor to Belgium's 
overall level of quasi-fixed costs. Things are trickier when it comes to "recurrent" quasi-fixed 
                                                 
28  This is slightly below the 20-23% that we got using firm-level data. But remember that PIAAC is only about 
gross wage whereas Bel-first, firm-level data used in previous section is about total payroll cost (with the 
possibility that some of elements constituting the differences (employers' social security contributions, taxes, 
perks) … drive fixed costs upwards). 
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labour costs; which American labour economists traditionally associate to nonwage 
compensation. Not all components amount to ‘purely’ quasi-fixed costs, as some are directly 
or indirectly indexed on hours. Only a cautious, case-by-case examination may lead to a definite 
judgement as to their degree of "fixity". 
 
Strictly speaking, in Belgium all social security contributions (financing the health and 
unemployment insurances and legal pensions; i.e. the 1st pillar) are computed as a percentage 
of the gross remuneration, that is itself proportional to the number of hours worked. Therefore, 
these contributions do a priori not qualify as "fixed". Also, in principle, important mandatory 
benefits (end-of-year bonus, single and double holiday bonuses) are directly indexed on annual 
hours of hours. For instance, if the worker has been absent during the year, the amount of her 
end-of-the-year bonus is reduced pro-rata the number of days of absence. The same logic holds 
for occupational pensions (the so-called 2nd pillar of the pension system, paid by the employers 
to top-up legal pensions). Instalments are indexed on salaries, and thus on hours. However, 
there exist in Belgium many regimes of "assimilation" i.e. days not worked but "assimilated" 
to days of work and thus remunerated and/or qualifying for social security payments. The most 
important one is the regime of employer-paid sick leave29. But the list also comprises 
maternity/parental leave, educational/training leave, union leave… There is also a regime of 
"economic unemployment"; i.e. situations of temporary economic recess where workers are 
sent home but are still paid by the employers. All these "assimilated" days give rise to a sizeable 
additional labour cost… but which is a priori indexed on hours worked30.  
 
This said, there are, in Belgium many elements of nonwage compensation that are clearly 
"fixed". Employers must insure each employer against the risk of workplace and home-to-work 
commuting accident. Whatever the number of hours worked, employees benefit from 
mandatory, employer-paid, health checks performed on the workplace. More significantly, over 
the past decades, and mainly for fiscal reasons31, Belgian employers have considerably 
expanded the use of in-kind benefits. These are quintessentially "fixed". The most significant 
one is the company car (that can represent up to 20% of a worker's gross remuneration). Other 
in-kinds comprise home/work travel allowances32, mobile phones, laptops and tablets… There 
are many other sources of "fixity" worth mentioning. An example are the relatively strict rules 
regarding the minimum duration [and pay] for part-time and night-shift work. For part-time, 
the contract should be for a weekly minimum of 1/3 of the reference full time; with a daily 
                                                 
29  Paid sickness leaves represent a large cost for firms. In fact, in the Belgian system, sickness leave is highly 
comparable to paid holiday in terms of cost for the firm. The first 30 days of each sick leave are paid for by 
the employer; and days of absence due to sickness still entitle workers to the associated yearly premium, paid 
holidays, pension and health insurances, … After 30 consecutive days, the replacement wage is paid for by 
the social security and the worker may lose some of the perks. On average in Belgium, 50% of employees take 
at least one day of sick leave per year. Among those, sick leaves last on average 13 days but the average 
number of days paid by the firm is around 5 days. The percentage of workers taking at least one sick day is 
similar among blue and white collars, but the average leave length is quite different, 8 days for white collar (5 
paid for by the firm), 16 days for blue collar (7 paid for by the firm). The share of workers taking at least one 
day of sick leave also strongly increases with the size (number of workers) of the firm: from 32% for firms of 
1 to 4 workers up to 60% for the largest firms (above 1000 workers). 
30  Mathematically, if H1 is the number of hours actually worked and H2 is the number of "assimilated" hours, the 
total labour cost writes LC= F+wH1+wH2 = F+w(H1+H2). If H2/H1=α is constant (ex: a probability of 
illness...), then the assimilated days are similar to a variable costs i.e. LC= F+w(1+α)H1. There is simply that 
the effective wage rate w$=w(1+α) is inflated pro-rata the typical share of "assimilated" hours. 
31  Belgium is characterised by a very large fiscal wedge on labour. One way for companies and workers to reduce 
payment is to resort to in-kind benefits.  
32  Akin full-time workers, part-time workers are fully eligible. 
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minimum of 3 hours. Per-day minima for night-shift workers (> 10 PM) is even stricter33.  The 
point is they are a clear source of non-proportionality between labour costs and hours. Returning 
to the issue of "assimilated" hours, there are reasons to believe that, in the expression 
LC=F+w(1+α)H1, α= H2/H1 is probably decreasing with H1. Why? The most obvious case is 
that of temporary/economic unemployment. It typically intervenes during periods of overall 
reduction of the number hours worked (i.e. low H1). Also, some "assimilation" regimes (e.g. 
maternity leave) are more frequent among employees who typically work less hours (women). 
One unknown feature of Belgium's occupational pensions is the presence of "social" 
contributions: extra payments by employers aimed at improving the pension capital of the 
lowest earners; that also often correspond to those working less hours34. Finally, it is likely that 
more and more recruitment decisions (at least for white-collars and middle or top managers...) 
amount to lump-sum commitments: an annual salary (+ benefits) for an indicative number of 
hours of service; that de facto fluctuate considerably, with no or little implications on the 
amount received. This increase in lump-sum work contracts emerges mostly for tax avoidance 
and employee motivation reasons but it should be understood from our work that this 
phenomenon most probably has strong consequences on working time demand by firms. 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
Hours worked tend to vary across individuals, but also – on average – across firms, and even 
within firm over time. Why? Over the past decades, most economists have privileged the idea 
that shorter versus longer hours (leaving labour-market regulations aside) had primarily to do 
with the preferences of individuals. In this work, echoing Pencavel (2016)'s question of "Whose 
Preferences Are Revealed in Hours of Works?", we explore the role of employers' preferences 
for working time; and in particular the role of quasi-fixed labour costs. By quasi-fixed labour 
costs, we mean any expense that are associated with employing a worker but are independent 
of his/her hours of work (such as the costs of fringe benefits, sickness leaves, hiring and training 
new workers, firing workers35 …). 
 
We consider a setup where firms decide simultaneously on working hours and the number of 
workers. We find that despite an obvious productivity gain from reducing working hours, firms 
facing large quasi-fixed labour costs choose a higher level of hours to cover such quasi-fixed 
labour costs. 
 
We estimate that increasing hours by one percent would only increase the output (value-added) 
by 0.8 percent, thus in line with the hypothesis of decreasing marginal return to working hours, 
and that imperfect substitutability between hours and workers in the production process. What 
is more – and to our knowledge this is a novelty – we able to retrieve the relative share of quasi-
fixed labour costs:  20 to 23 percent of a worker’s cost could be independent from hours. These 
econometric results suggest that the typical for-profit firm located in Belgium face financial 
incentives to raise hours beyond the point where the average productivity starts declining. They 
                                                 
33  Min{6 hours, typical day-shift number of hours}. 
34  Formally, the consequences of H2/H1 being non-constant are that the average labour cost per hour becomes 
LC/H1 = F/ H1 + w(1+α(H1)) and the derivative with respect to hours worked d(LC/H1)/dH1=-F/H12 + 
wdα(H1)dH1. So, if dα(H1)dH1<0, the deflating effect of longer hours of work H1 is magnified. Formally, the 
consequences of H2/H1 being non-constant are that the average labour cost per hour becomes LC/H1 = F/ H1 
+ w(1+α(H1)) and the derivative with respect to hours worked d(LC/H1)/dH1=-F/H12 + wdα(H1)dH1. So if 
dα(H1)dH1<0, the deflating effect of longer hours of work H1 is magnified. 
35  Recruitment, training or firing costs typically intervene as fixed labour costs pro rata firms' turnover rate. 
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explain why ceteris paribus some industries (i.e. those with higher quasi-fixed labour costs) are 
characterised by longer hours and a lower propensity to employ people on a part-time basis. 
They could also explain why some firms, or some industries oppose reducing working hours, 
even in the absence of compensatory36 rise of hourly wages.  
 
In short, when it comes to working time policies – often touted as crucial to accommodate the 
varying needs and desires of postmodern individuals – firms' preferences and their determinants 
should not be ignored. As long as firm have some power to determine the hours of work of their 
employee, taking into account their preferences will allow policy makers to better understand 
why some sectors more than others might oppose working-time reduction policies. Also, 
reducing or eliminating quasi-fixed labour costs can be an additional lever to increase the 
opportunities of gradual retirement for the swelling ranks of older workers. 
 
  
                                                 
36  By 'compensatory' rise of hourly wages we refer to what is needed to meet demands of reduced working 
without any loss of total wage.  
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Appendix 
 
A. Derivations of the model with non-proportional labour costs 
 
Quasi-fixed labour costs do not need to be absolutely invariant to hours worked for the key 
predictions of the model to remain valid. A more general version of the cost function would 
include fixed cost that can vary with hours worked F(H) but increase less than proportionally 
to hours (F’(H)<0). The model then develops as follow: 
 
With total cost equal to C(N, H) = FF +  N[w(H)H + F(H)], the key equilibrium condition 
becomes: 
σ(H, N) =  g′(H)g(H)H = γ(H, N) = 1 +  ε + F′1 +  rF  
where: 
 
F' <0 is the negative sensitivity of quasi-fixed labour costs to hours ; 
ε ≡
w′(H)
w(H)
H
 the elasticity of hourly wage to working hours; 
rF ≡  F(H)
w(H)H the ratio of quasi-fixed to variable worker-level labour costs. 
 
The larger quasi-fixed costs F(H) relative to variable costs w(H)H, the larger the ratio rF, the 
smaller the equilibrium value of γ. In this case, γ will also be smaller if quasi-fixed costs are 
strongly non-proportional. 
 
It follows that:  1 − γ(H, N) =  F(H)−F′(H)H
F(H)+w(H)H such that 1 − γ(H, N) now measures the share of 
quasi-fixed cost in total labour costs taking into account the contribution of longer hours to the 
reduction of quasi-fixed costs. 
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B. Additional results of the main econometric analysis 
 
Table 5a – Econometric estimation of the productivity of hours and of the (relative) importance of 
quasi-fixed labour costs – OLS 
 
 1st order approximation 2nd order approximation 3nd order approximation 
 Productivity Labour cost Productivity Labour cost Productivity Labour cost 
kit≡ln(Kit) 0.139***  0.136***  0.136***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
nit≡ln(Nit) 0.852*** 1.025*** 0.851*** 1.025*** 0.856*** 1.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
hit≡ln(Hit) 0.778*** 0.894*** 0.864*** 0.975*** 0.851*** 0.950*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) 
nit2   0.0145*** 0.00821*** 0.0154*** 0.00999*** 
   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
hit2   0.0882*** 0.0820*** 0.0261*** -0.0184*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) 
nit hit   0.0987*** 0.105*** 0.0269*** 0.0363*** 
   (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
nit3     -0.00110*** -0.00146*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
hit3     -0.0145*** -0.0210*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
nit2hit     0.00307* 0.00595*** 
     (0.002) (0.001) 
nit hit2     -0.0154*** -0.0152*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls Control: year, province, join commission and industry(NAICS 4-digit) 
R2 .83 .92 .83 .92 .83 .92 
Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost/isoquant 
σ;γ 0.91 0.87 0.86 0.97 0.85 0.95 
Prob=1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5b – Econometric estimation of the productivity of hours and of the (relative) importance of 
quasi-fixed labour costs – Fixed effect as first differences 
 
 1st order approximation 2nd order approximation 3nd order approximation 
Productivity Labour 
cost 
Productivity Labour 
cost 
Productivity Labour 
cost 
kit≡ln(Kit) 0.0913***  0.0903***  0.0881***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
nit≡ln(Nit) 0.661*** 0.843*** 0.643*** 0.815*** 0.702*** 0.850*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
hit≡ln(Hit) 0.542*** 0.650*** 0.537*** 0.642*** 0.630*** 0.720*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
nit2   0.0252*** 0.0392*** 0.0217*** 0.0259*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
hit2   0.00215 -0.00771*** -0.00954*** -0.00651*** 
   (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
nit hit   0.0304*** 0.0326*** 0.0110*** 0.0176*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
nit3     -0.00625*** 0.00128*** 
     (0.001) (0.000) 
hit3     -0.0128*** -0.0131*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
nit2hit     -0.00302** 0.00955*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
nit hit2     -0.0103*** -0.00633*** 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Controls Control: year, province, join commission and industry(NAICS 4-digit) 
R2 .35 .6 .36 .6 .37 .62 
Implied elasticities along the effective labour isocost/isoquant 
σ;γ 0.82 0.77 0.54 0.64 0.63 0.72 
Prob=1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Source: Bel-first 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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C. Estimation of elasticities by industry 
 
Table 10: Estimation of elasticities, by industry (NACE 3) 
NACE 3-digit Nobs gj Prob γj=1 σj Prob σj=1 
103_Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables 330 1.03 0.0000 1.08 0.0000 
106_Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products 135 0.85 0.0000 0.92 0.1221 
108_Manufacture of other food products 916 0.95 0.0000 0.74 0.0000 
110_Manufacture of beverages 357 0.71 0.0000 0.82 0.0000 
131_Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 207 0.87 0.0000 1.00 0.8482 
132_Weaving of textiles 257 0.66 0.0000 0.70 0.0000 
139_Manufacture of other textiles 544 0.82 0.0000 0.73 0.0000 
141_Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel 312 0.92 0.0000 0.91 0.0000 
162_Manufacture of products of wood, cork, straw and plaiting materials 566 0.83 0.0000 0.80 0.0000 
171_Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 193 0.95 0.0080 0.83 0.0000 
172_Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard 394 0.88 0.0000 0.90 0.0000 
181_Printing and service activities related to printing 986 0.82 0.0000 0.64 0.0000 
201_Manufacture of basic chemicals, fertilisers and nitrogen compounds, plastics and synthetic rubber in primary forms 821 0.73 0.0000 0.65 0.0000 
204_Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and toilet preparations 195 0.90 0.0000 0.66 0.0000 
212_Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations 294 0.61 0.0000 0.75 0.0000 
222_Manufacture of plastics products 1169 0.85 0.0000 0.81 0.0000 
233_Manufacture of clay building materials 105 0.86 0.0000 0.74 0.0041 
236_Manufacture of articles of concrete, cement and plaster 853 0.74 0.0000 0.65 0.0000 
241_Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys 212 0.77 0.0000 0.84 0.0036 
252_Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal 192 0.92 0.0000 0.87 0.0000 
255_Forging, pressing, stamping and roll-forming of metal; powder metallurgy 207 0.68 0.0000 0.99 0.4761 
256_Treatment and coating of metals; machining 1007 0.84 0.0000 0.68 0.0000 
257_Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware 121 0.67 0.0000 0.83 0.0545 
261_Manufacture of electronic components and boards 162 0.66 0.0000 0.89 0.3448 
262_Manufacture of computers and peripheral equipment 44 0.77 0.0083 0.90 0.8064 
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263_Manufacture of communication equipment 137 0.82 0.0570 1.00 0.9506 
265_Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, testing and navigation; watches and clocks 178 0.72 0.0000 0.78 0.0000 
271_Manufacture of electric motors, generators, transformers and electric distribution and control apparatus 232 0.93 0.0000 1.07 0.0000 
279_Manufacture of other electrical equipment 139 0.63 0.0000 1.17 0.0000 
281_Manufacture of general -- purpose machinery 268 0.91 0.0000 0.93 0.0236 
282_Manufacture of other general-purpose machinery 736 0.72 0.0000 0.72 0.0000 
283_Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 152 0.88 0.0000 0.93 0.4027 
289_Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery 430 0.92 0.0000 1.19 0.0000 
291_Manufacture of motor vehicles 90 0.61 0.0550 0.69 0.0475 
293_Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles 332 0.61 0.0000 0.68 0.0000 
331_Repair of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment 391 0.84 0.0000 0.92 0.0000 
332_Installation of industrial machinery and equipment 172 0.90 0.0000 0.76 0.0000 
370_Sewerage 95 0.88 0.0000 0.81 0.0000 
381_Waste collection 106 0.81 0.0000 0.70 0.0000 
412_Construction of residential and non-residential buildings 3368 0.80 0.0000 0.72 0.0000 
421_Construction of roads and railways 1127 0.88 0.0000 0.90 0.0000 
422_Construction of utility projects 645 0.84 0.0000 1.05 0.0000 
429_Construction of other civil engineering projects 196 0.77 0.0000 1.16 0.0554 
431_Demolition and site preparation 566 0.84 0.0000 0.75 0.0000 
432_Electrical, plumbing and other construction installation activities 2580 0.68 0.0000 0.61 0.0000 
461_Wholesale on a fee or contract basis 359 0.90 0.0000 0.71 0.0000 
466_Wholesale of other machinery, equipment and supplies 2996 0.81 0.0000 0.68 0.0000 
467_Other specialised wholesale 3004 0.70 0.0000 0.80 0.0000 
469_Non-specialised wholesale trade 328 0.76 0.0000 0.68 0.0000 
471_Retail sale in non-specialised stores 2442 0.69 0.0000 0.77 0.0000 
472_Retail sale of food, beverages and tobacco in specialised stores 641 0.80 0.0000 0.60 0.0000 
475_Retail sale of other household equipment in specialised stores 1571 0.83 0.0000 0.61 0.0000 
476_Retail sale of cultural and recreation goods in specialised stores 254 0.62 0.0000 0.69 0.0000 
477_Retail sale of other goods in specialised stores 2339 0.93 0.0000 0.74 0.0000 
521_Warehousing and storage 966 0.82 0.0000 0.93 0.0000 
551_Hotels and similar accommodation 1262 0.84 0.0000 0.79 0.0000 
 
 
32 
552_Holiday and other short-stay accommodation 73 0.94 0.0000 0.66 0.0000 
561_Restaurants and mobile food service activities 2401 0.76 0.0000 0.70 0.0000 
562_Event catering and other food service activities 531 0.79 0.0000 0.86 0.0000 
612_Wireless telecommunications activities 153 1.09 0.0000 0.75 0.0000 
620_Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 2317 0.75 0.0000 0.74 0.0000 
631_Data processing, hosting and related activities; web portals 156 0.65 0.0000 1.05 0.0271 
642_Activities of holding companies 609 0.65 0.0000 0.80 0.0000 
661_Activities auxiliary to financial services, except insurance and pension funding 700 0.69 0.0000 0.72 0.0000 
682_Renting and operating of own or leased real estate 633 0.80 0.0000 0.77 0.0000 
683_Real estate activities on a fee or contract basis 158 0.97 0.0000 0.70 0.0000 
692_Accounting, bookkeeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy 342 0.90 0.0000 0.91 0.0000 
702_Management consultancy activities 996 0.80 0.0000 0.89 0.0000 
711_Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy 1096 0.89 0.0000 0.78 0.0000 
731_Advertising 575 0.75 0.0000 0.82 0.0000 
741_Specialised design activities 79 1.12 0.0000 1.00 0.9483 
743_Translation and interpretation activities 52 1.24 0.0004 0.95 0.4670 
773_Renting and leasing of other machinery, equipment and tangible goods 323 0.81 0.0000 0.61 0.0000 
802_Security systems service activities 67 0.80 0.3075 0.86 0.5561 
811_Combined facilities support activities 119 0.92 0.0000 0.81 0.0000 
813_Landscape service activities 248 0.73 0.0000 1.01 0.7703 
829_Business support service activities n.e.c. 713 0.96 0.0036 0.62 0.0000 
872_Residential care activities for mental retardation, mental health and substance abuse 77 0.89 0.0000 1.16 0.3031 
889_Other social work activities without accommodation 388 1.00 0.9982 1.05 0.0000 
931_Sports activities 334 0.95 0.0000 0.66 0.0000 
932_Amusement and recreation activities 188 0.83 0.0000 0.94 0.0003 
952_Repair of personal and household goods 98 1.23 0.0000 0.66 0.0000 
960_Other personal service activities 979 0.68 0.0000 0.64 0.0000 
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D. Econometric results for the PIACC dataset 
 
Table 11 - Econometric Results- Worker-level (cross-sectional) analysis. Conditional impact of (log 
of) hours on (log of) average hourly gross wage (computed as the ratio [weekly] gross wage/hours). 
Belgium (Flanders) vs. other OECD countries 
 
 BEL 
h -0.180*** 
 (0.024) 
Experience 0.027*** 
 (0.002) 
Experience2 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
Schooling years 0.034*** 
 (0.004) 
Score (log of)$ 0.179** 
 (0.059) 
Female -0.095*** 
 (0.020) 
Other controls Occup (ISCO 2008 2-digit) indus(ISIC 2-digit) fixed effects   
 Estimates of the wage$ /hours elasticity 
δhc/δh =- F/(F+wH) ≈  ϕ si 
W'(H)=0  
-0.180*** 
Prob  ϕ = 0 0.000 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
$ the respondent's average test score in literacy, numeracy and problem solving 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Source: PIAAC- OECD 2012 
 
ISSN 1379-244X D/2017/3082/22
